International trade relies on trade …nance (credit or insurance) by …nancial institutions. Data limitations, however, have made it di¢ cult to quantify the impact of changes in the supply of trade …nance on trade. This paper is the …rst to establish a causal link between the supply of private credit insurance and exports. I overcome endogeneity issues by using a unique bilateral data set which covers the activities from 1992 to 2006 of one of the world's leading private credit insurers. This database enables me to use the insurer's claim ratio -a primary determinant of the supply of credit insurance -as an instrument for insured exports. Subsequently, applying the method of instrumental variables and a variety of trade models, I consistently …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of private credit insurance on exports. The estimates are economically relevant and suggest that, depending on the decline in the supply of private credit insurance during the 2008-09 international trade collapse, the reduction in private insurance exposure explains about 5 to 9 percent of the drop in world exports and 10 to 20 percent of the drop in European exports.
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Motivation
Financial institutions play an important role in facilitating international trade. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of world trade relies on some form of credit, insurance or guarantee, issued by a bank or other …nancial institution (Auboin, 2007) . However, direct evidence on the link between trade …nance and trade is still missing, because detailed data on trade …nance is hard to come by. 1 As a result, it is unclear to what extent changes in the supply of trade …nance have an e¤ect on trade.
A number of authors have studied the trade …nance channel, but use inadequate proxies for trade credit provided by banks or …nancial institutions. These studies examine whether the availability of trade credit or dollar-denominated short-term credit a¤ect exports (Ronci, This study exploits a unique bilateral data set on the worldwide activities of a leading private credit insurer to examine the e¤ect of private credit insurance on exports. It is the …rst to focus on private export credit insurance and to establish a causal link between the private supply of a trade …nance product and exports. Importantly, the data enable me to deal with reverse causality and other potential endogeneity issues by using the private insurer's claim ratio -received claims over premium income -as an instrument for insured exports. Past and current claim ratios are a primary determinant of the insurer's supply of credit insurance. Subsequently, using the method of instrumental variables, I …nd an average multiplier of private credit insurance of 2.3, implying that every euro of insured exports generates 2.3 euro of total exports.
Trade credit insurance is a useful tool for …rms to insure against the risk of non-payment. Especially in cross-border transactions where it is more costly to monitor risks and more di¢ cult to 1 enforce payment, the provision of credit insurance could foster trade. The trade-promoting e¤ect of credit insurance is described in a formal model by Funatsu (1986) , who shows that insurance cover of trade credits will result in a higher output level as compared to the case without insurance.
Empirically, the evidence of a trade-promoting e¤ect of credit insurance is limited to the case of public guarantees. Two important contributions are Egger and Url (2006) and Moser, Nestmann and Wedow (2008) who …nd that Austrian and German public export credit guarantees stimulate trade in the long run.
For a number of reasons, however, the private credit insurance e¤ect on trade can be expected to di¤er from the impact of public guarantees. First, changes in the exposure of private credit insurance are likely to a¤ect exports immediately, whereas the short run impact of public guarantees is found to be very small (see Egger and Url, 2006; and Moser, Nestmann and Wedow, 2008) . This di¤erence follows from the varying maturities of private versus public credit insurance. Private credit insurers usually cover short-term credits with a tenor of 60 to 120 days and medium-or long-term covers only play a minor role (Swiss Re, 2006) . Public guarantees, on the other hand, generally cover export projects with a duration between two and …ve years. So the actual shipment of the good usually follows a few years after the public provision of insurance cover. This di¤erence in maturities is especially clear in Europe, where o¢ cial export credit agencies have been restricted from providing guarantees covering export risks to OECD core members with a maturity of less than two years. 2 Second, relative changes in the supply of private credit insurance are likely to have a bigger impact on total exports than changes in the supply of public guarantees. Obviously, this goes for countries where the value of privately insured exports exceeds the value of public guarantees. For example, private insurers covered an estimated 16.7 percent of Dutch exports in 2006, compared to 0.9 percent of exports insured by the Dutch State. 3 Aside from a bigger impact due to the size of the private credit insurance market, the greater e¤ect on overall exports also stems from the potential in ‡uence of private credit insurers on the export decision of non-insured …rms. That is, private credit insurers provide valuable information on the creditworthiness of …rms via changes in their policy stance vis-à-vis individual …rms, their publicly available country ratings, and their detailed …rm-speci…c information services.
I test with a gravity model whether private credit insurance stimulates trade and consistently …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect. The bilateral data set includes data on privately 2 insured exports from 25 countries to 183 destination countries covering the period from 1992 to 2006. The data cover the insurance provided and claims and premiums received by one of the "Big Three" private credit insurers. 4 Importantly, the data enable me to identify in a …rst instance the link between the claims received by the insurer and the supply of insurance, thereby overcoming endogeneity issues. Also, I show results using more than one strategy to deal with "multilateral resistance" to trade; the average barrier of two countries to trade with all their partners. In what follows, I describe the rise of private credit insurance since the early 1990s (Section 2), brie ‡y review the literature (Section 3), and examine empirically the private credit insurance e¤ect on trade (Section 4). In Section 5, I test the sensitivity of the benchmark results to sample changes, endogeneity issues, the availability of public export credit guarantees, and possible misspeci…cation related to measuring "multilateral resistance" to trade. Section 6 examines the role of private credit insurance in the 2008-09 world trade collapse. Section 7 concludes.
The Rise of Private Credit Insurance
Since the early 1990s, private trade credit insurance has registered strong growth and now dominates the short term market. 5 In 1999, more than 95 percent of the short term business from Europe was underwritten by the private sector (Swiss Re, 2006 (Swiss Re, 2006) . Since the late 1990s, the American and Asian markets are growing in importance, however, and Europe's share of the world insurance market is declining.
In 2010, three private credit insurers -the "Big Three" -covered 87 percent of the world market:
Euler Hermes (36%), Atradius (31%) and Coface (20%). These private insurers usually cover short term commercial and political risk. Commercial risk refers primarily to the risk of non-payment by the importer due to default or insolvency, whereas political risk relates to non-payment as a result of action by an importer's government. 6 More recently, the "Big Three" have also started to cover longer maturities, but o¢ cial export credit agencies are still the primary players in this market.
The rise of private credit insurance followed a number of actions by OECD governments since the debt crisis in the 1980s. The international debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s had a profound impact on how countries viewed their export credit agencies (Stephens, 1999) . The crisis caused considerable claims for o¢ cial export credit agencies that became a drain on government budgets. O¢ cial export credit agencies experienced a net cash ‡ow de…cit during the period from 1981 to 1995 (Wang et al. 2005 ). These losses led governments to rethink their role in the provision of export …nance and their competition and overlap with private sector insurers.
At the national level, OECD governments started to privatize their short-term activities. The privatization trend began by the decision of the United Kingdom in 1991 to sell the short-term business of its export credit agency (Stephens, 1999) . The United States government followed suit in 1992, and Coface (one of the "Big Three" private insurers) of France was privatized in 1994. Instead of sales or transfers removing the export credit agencies'short-term business to private hands, part of the privatization has taken place more silently (Wang et al. 2005 ). For example, in the Netherlands, Atradius (formerly NCM), acting as an agent of the government, has insured an increasing amount of business on its own accounts.
At the international level, the European Union de…ned the concept of "marketable risks" to clarify what type of business should be left to private insurers. As a result, since 1998, o¢ cial export credit agencies have been restricted from providing guarantees covering export risks to OECD core members with a maturity of less than two years. Public guarantees, therefore, generally cover business with a credit period longer than two years.
Literature Review
Existing empirical studies focus exclusively on public credit insurance and predict an economically signi…cant e¤ect on exports in the long run. For example, Egger and Url (2006) estimate that a one percent increase of Austrian guarantees generates a .44 percent long-term increase in Austrian exports. In turn, they compute an average multiplier of 2.8, implying that every euro spend on public guarantees creates 2.8 euro worth of exports. Moser, Nestmann and Wedow (2008) conduct a similar analysis for German guarantees, but account for possible endogeneity issues and trade dynamics. In turn, they …nd a somewhat lower multiplier of 1.7.
The theoretical explanation for this trade-promoting e¤ect of export credit insurance dates back to Funatsu (1986) . He shows that a government can aggressively promote exports by o¤ering a public guarantee against default by the importer and demanding a "more-than-favourable" premium rate. By using a credit guarantee, a …rm can reduce its pro…t uncertainty in the foreign market thereby increasing the …rm's optimal output level. The reduction in risk increases exports to markets where the …rm would not sell otherwise. Abraham and Dewit (2000) demonstrate that government guarantees can stimulate …rms to export even without subsidisation by charging a fair premium.
Thus, the rationale for the trade-promoting e¤ect of export credit insurance seems to apply as well to private insurers, who are unlikely to subsidize their clients.
These models, however, cannot explain the multiplier e¤ect; the …nding that the increase in export value is greater than the value of insured exports. The rationale for such a multiplier e¤ect follows from the presence of sunk costs (Dixit, 1989) . When …rms face substantial entry costs, prior export experience increases the probability of exporting by as much as 60 percentage points (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) . By providing insurance cover, public and private credit insurers reduce the costs of insecurity and information related to the entry in foreign markets, allowing their clients to learn about the creditworthiness of their trade partners (buyers). Subsequently, after repeated transactions, the client may decide to export without costly export credit insurance.
A multiplier e¤ect of private credit insurance could, however, also follow from the information on foreign markets and …rms that private insurers provide to non-insured …rms. 7 First, a private credit insurer's policy stance vis-à-vis a particular …rm (buyer) or country could have a "signalling e¤ect", in ‡uencing the export decision of non-insured …rms. Indeed, the news of an adjustment of a …rm rating or credit limit -the maximum exposure of the insurer in respect of a buyer -tends to travel fast among all suppliers of the particular …rm, potentially in ‡uencing all trade transactions of the …rm (Becue, 2009, p. 91 ). I.e. an upgrade generally improves the …rm's access to supplier credit, and vice versa. Moreover, private credit insurers publish their country ratings. In principle, private credit insurers let the country rating prevail over their sector-and …rm-level rating when determining 5 premia and their maximum level of exposure. As a result, a …rm can have a favourable rating but still have a low or zero credit limit when the …rm is situated in a weakly rated country (Becue, 2009, p. 518) . Finally, the "Big Three" insurers all o¤er some kind of information service, allowing …rms to get access to the insurers'detailed …rm-level information on key customers, prospects or competitors even without buying insurance cover. 8 In short, private credit insurance could promote exports via a reduction in export risk and information costs.
The Private Credit Insurance E¤ect on Exports

Speci…cation and Data
To estimate the private credit insurance e¤ect on exports, I rely on the standard "gravity" model of bilateral trade. The gravity model explains trade between a pair of countries with the distance and their economic "masses". I augment the basic speci…cation with a number of conditioning variables that might also a¤ect bilateral trade, such as currency unions (Glick and Rose, 2002 ) and trade agreements (Rose, 2004) . I employ the following speci…cation:
where i denotes the exporting country, j denotes the importer, t denotes time, ln(:) denotes the natural logarithm operator, and the variables are de…ned as:
X ijt denotes real FOB exports from i to j, measured in euro, D is the distance between i and j, P op is population, GDP pc is annual real GDP per capita, CU is a binary dummy variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, RT A is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a regional trade agreement at t, Border is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, Islands is the number of island countries in the pair (0/1/2), Area is the log of the product of the areas of the countries, ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were both colonized by the same country, Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i colonizes j at time t (or vice versa), EverCol is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j (or vice versa), SameCtry is a binary variable which is unity if i is part of the same country at time t (or vice versa), InsExp denotes real privately insured exports from i to j, measured in euro, " represents the omitted other in ‡uences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved.
The parameter of interest is 1 . This represents the private credit insurance e¤ect on exports holding other export determinants constant through the gravity model. I estimate the equation with OLS, using a robust covariance estimator (clustered by country-pair dyads) to handle heteroskedasticity, adding year-speci…c …xed e¤ects. I also adjust this speci…cation in two important ways. First, I add a comprehensive set of dyadic-speci…c …xed e¤ects (i.e., a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of { ij } intercepts) to absorb any time invariant characteristics that are common to a pair of countries. Second, I add comprehensive sets of exporter and importer …xed e¤ects (i.e., sets of { i } and { j }) to take account of any time invariant country-speci…c factors. I also show below that the key results are insensitive to the use of other estimation strategies.
The sources of the bilateral data set are described in more detail in Appendix Table A1 . This data set includes annual observations between 1992 and 2006 (though with many missing observations) for some 183 territories and localities (I refer to these as "countries" below). The countries themselves are tabulated in Table A2 . A correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression analysis is presented in Table A3 .
Data on Private Credit Insurance
The data on privately insured exports is the novel part of the data set and measures the real value of exports insured (InsExp ijt ) by one of the "Big Three" private credit insurers. 9 Summary statistics for insured exports and the share of insured to total exports are presented in Table 1 . Several features regarding the data on insured exports are worth mentioning.
First, the data set on insured exports is constrained in two speci…c ways. That is, the number of exporters is limited to 25 countries (all OECD members, except for Hong Kong) in which the private insurer is active and data is available. Second, the number of observations per exporter varies considerably (Table 1 , Column 2). This re ‡ects i) the entrance of the private insurer into new markets (countries) over the years and ii) di¤erences in the number of destination countries of each exporter.
In addition, a special feature of the data is the variability in the private insurer's share of insured to total exports, varying from zero percent up to one hundred percent. 10 Also, the mean (median) share of insured exports for all exporters is 6.6 (1.5), but this …gure varies by exporter from 0.1 in Poland to 20.4 in Denmark.
Finally, the insurance data su¤er from some measurement issues. Possible measurement errors arise because i) clients of the insurer declare their turnover (value of insured exports) at di¤erent frequencies; monthly, quarterly or yearly, ii) the amounts are allocated to periods when they were invoiced by the insurer which does not always coincide with the period when the shipments took place, and iii) data is migrated from systems used by acquired companies. Part of the measurement errors is reduced by the yearly frequency of the data. More importantly, I apply the method of instrumental variables which was pioneered to overcome measurement error problems in explanatory variables (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Hausman, 2001 ). 11 
Benchmark Results
The results of estimating the default speci…cation are presented in Table 2 . The model is estimated with three di¤erent sets of …xed e¤ects (none, dyad, and exporter/importer). Before I discuss the private credit insurance e¤ect on trade, I brie ‡y discuss the other determinants of trade ‡ows.
The model …ts the data well. I obtain a high R-squared which is typical for gravity models and the coe¢ cient estimates are sensible. For instance, exports between a pair of countries fall with distance and increase when countries share a currency, language, trade agreement or colonial heritage. In addition, countries with a higher GDP per capita import more. The sign of the coe¢ cient for the importer's population and exporter's real GDP per capita changes, however, when including …xed e¤ects. Thus, larger and richer countries trade more (cross-sectional variation), but importers with high population growth or exporters with high GDP per capita growth trade less, ceteris paribus.
Turning to the estimates of greatest interest; private credit insurance seems to stimulate exports. Consequently, one could argue that an increase of coverage could simply re ‡ect an increase in the insurer's share of the credit insurance market, making it unclear why this would stimulate trade. It is, however, unlikely that substitution of credit insurance towards the private insurer drives the results.
For one thing, the credit insurance penetration rate (measured as premium income over GDP) has risen steadily since 1990 in most of the large European markets, and credit insurance markets outside Europe have grown even faster (Swiss Re, 2006). In addition, I show below that the results hold for various reasonable changes in the sample. These robustness checks make it even more unlikely that market share increases of the private insurer explain the …ndings. Another concern, however, could be that I overestimate the credit insurance e¤ect on trade because I include markets where the private insurer is only a small player. In the sensitivity analysis below, I estimate the model for various subsamples related to the share of insured to total exports covered by the private insurer.
Excluding the markets in which the private insurer is likely to have a small share does not reduce the estimate of the private credit insurance e¤ect on trade. On the contrary, the private credit insurance e¤ect increases with the share of insured to total exports.
A second, and related, issue is that the benchmark speci…cation may su¤er from an endogeneity problem. Instead of some exogenous factor leading the insurer to extend more coverage (i.e. better marketing of products, improvements in risk management practices reducing premia and maximum exposure, lower risks in particular countries etc.), growth in trade could also explain growth in insured exports. In the sensitivity analysis that follows below, I deal explicitly with the issue of endogeneity by applying the method of instrumental variables.
9
5 Sensitivity Analysis
Robustness of the Private Credit Insurance E¤ect
I start the sensitivity analysis with a battery of robustness checks based on reasonable changes to the sample. The purpose of this exercise is to show that the main results are not caused by some small subset of the sample. The results are presented in Table 3 . Each of the rows in the table corresponds to a di¤erent sensitivity check, while the columns correspond to the benchmark model estimated with three di¤erent sets of …xed e¤ects, and also report the number of observations in each subsample.
I check the sensitivity of the results by selectively dropping di¤erent sets of observations. Since I am interested in exporter e¤ects, I begin by dropping di¤erent sets of importer observations. First, I drop all observations for importers that are industrial. I then successively delete observations for developing countries from Latin America or the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, or for (formerly) centrally managed economies. 12 These robustness checks leave the basic results unchanged.
The same goes when dropping small importers (de…ned as a country with fewer than one million people) or poor importers (those with real GDP per capita of less than 1000 euro per annum). I then check the sensitivity of the results for some sets of exporter observations. Successively, I drop non-European exporters and exporters not in the sample before 1995. Again, none of these changes to the sample undermine the …ndings. Further, I check the sensitivity of the results with respect to time. I separately drop the observations before and after 1999 respectively; the results remain resilient. Finally, I successively delete observations in which the share of insured exports (by the private insurer) to total exports is smaller than 1, 2, 5 and 10 percent. Again, all the results show a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of insured exports on total exports. The size of the estimates, however, increases with the share of insured exports.
I conclude that the …nding of a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of private credit insurance on trade is not due to some subset of the sample and is robust to reasonable changes in the sample. Countries with a higher level of insured exports seem to have higher trade than others.
Endogeneity
Endogeneity is a primary concern in the estimates presented so far. For example, the total value of exports could explain the value of insured exports instead of the other way around. Aside from reverse causality, a third possibly omitted variable could arguably in ‡uence both total exports and insured exports. The risk environment is a case in point. An increase in the risk perceived by exporters might decrease total exports and increase demand for insurance. Note that the reverse causality argument and the omitted variable bias story would result in opposite biases. Thus, the direction of the bias in the benchmark results, if any, is unclear beforehand. 13 I address the issue of endogeneity by using an instrumental variable for insured exports and apply the two-stage least squares …xed e¤ects estimator. The instrument is the private insurer's claim ratio (by exporter-importer-year), de…ned as claims over premium income. Claims are a primary determinant of the supply of credit insurance.
The link between claims and insured exports runs through two channels. First, past and current claim ratios are important ingredients in the formula to calculate premia (Becue, 2009 ). 14 In case of a shock, i.e. a credit crisis or sovereign default, claims increase. The claim ratio also increases, as the private insurer can only raise the premia of new contracts. 15 The bulk of the contracts are …xed for one year during which the premium charge cannot change, and about 25 percent of all contracts have a duration of 2 or 3 years. A rise in the claim ratio reduces the pro…t of the private insurer, inducing an increase of the premium charged in new insurance contracts, thereby lowering the demand for insurance and hence the total value of insured exports.
The second channel linking claims and insured exports is more direct, and involves credit insurers' right to reduce or remove the credit limit of a speci…c buyer at any given time (Swiss Re, 2006; Jones, 2010). 16 While premium rates on contracts are …xed, credit insurers can manage their exposure (or "cover limit") to mitigate claims. This way, credit insurers can react to problems that can a¤ect a foreign buyer's credit quality even before they worsen. Thus, the mere expectation of rising claims can immediately a¤ect insured exports via a reduction in the maximum exposure of credit insurers.
The results for the First Stage regression on insured exports are presented in Table 4 , Column 1.
The F-statistic for the excluded instruments exceeds the rule of thumb value of 10 for all speci…cations, implying that the claim ratios are su¢ ciently correlated with insured exports. I …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the claim ratio on insured exports up to two years ahead. The point estimates indicate that a 1 percent increase in the claim ratio reduces insured exports by .11 percent in the same year, exports are .06 percent lower in the following year, and .04 percent lower the year thereafter. Importantly, estimation of the benchmark model including the claim ratios shows that the claim ratio has no direct e¤ect on total exports. 17 Thus, the e¤ect of the claim ratio on total exports runs only via the insured exports.
The results for the Second Stage regression on exports are presented in columns 2 to 5 of Table   4 . I estimate four speci…cations to check the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative instruments.
The …rst uses the contemporaneous, …rst and second lag of the claim ratio as instruments for insured exports. The second up to fourth estimations use either the contemporaneous, …rst or second lag of the claim ratio as instrument. All instruments are valid according to various statistical tests; none of the models is under-or weakly identi…ed and the …rst speci…cation with three instruments is not overidenti…ed. 18 The point estimate for the instrumented insured exports ranges between .02 and .09, a slightly smaller range compared to the benchmark results.
Since I use the log of the claim ratio I lose all observations with zero claims, about two-third of the sample. To see whether the results are sensitive to the sample size, I estimate the system with the claim ratio in levels. The results are presented in the …nal column of Table 4 . Reassuringly, the point estimate of .06 for the instrumented insured exports is equal to the estimate of the smaller sample in column 2, but the coe¢ cient is not signi…cant. Notice, however, that the F-statistic for the excluded instruments is only 6.89, well below the threshold value of 10. This implies that the claim ratio in levels is less …t as an instrument for the log insured exports.
Next, I examine whether the instrumental variable estimates are sensitive to various subsamples related to the share of insured to total exports. The results are presented in Table 5 . I estimate the system using the contemporaneous log claim ratio as instrument for the log insured exports. This way, I maximize the number of observations and the F-statistic for the excluded instruments, while being conservative on the size of the estimated private credit insurance e¤ect (compare Columns 2 to 5 of Table 4 ). Again, I …nd that the size of the estimate for insured exports increases when successively dropping observations with a share of insured to total exports below a certain threshold.
The size of the e¤ect ranges between .02 for the full sample (Table 5 19 The results presented in Table 7 con…rm that past exports a¤ect current exports. Yet, the main result is robust to this inclusion of trade dynamics. Insured exports stimulate total exports.
The range of the private credit insurance e¤ect is again somewhat larger, ranging from .01 to .51.
So far, I examined whether private credit insurance stimulates trade by relating the value of insured exports to the value of total exports. A possible concern of this set up is that insured exports are part of total exports. In order to see whether the …ndings are due to this particular approach, I re-estimated the instrumental variables model for the various subsamples, using the share of insured to total exports instead of the value of insured exports. The results are reported in Table   8 . Reassuringly, this alternative approach con…rms the positive e¤ect of private credit insurance on exports. The point estimate for the instrumented share of insured exports is statistically signi…cant 13 for all subsamples, although only at the 10 percent level for the subsamples with a share of insured exports above 5 or 10 percent. Again, the range of the private credit insurance e¤ect is somewhat larger compared to the results of the preferred approach, ranging from .02 to .53.
Thus far, I have been largely concerned with the statistical signi…cance and robustness of the results, but I have given no attention to the economic signi…cance. The instrumental variable models estimate a private credit insurance e¤ect on exports ranging between .01 and .53 (Tables 5 to 7 ).
These coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the elasticity of exports to insured exports, implying that a 1 per cent increase in insured exports leads to an increase in exports in the range of .01 to .53 per cent, depending on the threshold taken for the minimum share of insured exports. I calculate a world share of private short term insured exports to total exports of 6.1 percent in 2007. 20 Subsequently, I calculate the median share of insured exports for each of the subsamples and …nd the sample of observations with a share of insured exports above 1 percent to resemble the world share of short term insured exports. The average estimate of the elasticity for this subsample is .14 (see Tables 5 to   7 ). Likewise, for the Euro area countries, I calculate a share of private short term insured exports to total exports of 12.3 percent, and subsequently …nd an elasticity of .29. 21 Using the sample average of insured and total exports, I compute an average multiplier of private credit insurance of 2.3. 22 This result is important for a number of reasons. First, it shows that private credit insurance stimulates exports. Indeed, the short run impact of private credit insurance is bigger than the long run multiplier of public guarantees found in Moser, Nestmann and Wedow (2008). 23 Thus, private insurance allows …rms to learn about the creditworthiness of their trading partners by doing repeated business. The recurring trade transactions help a trading partner to build up its reputation, thereby reducing the need for the exporter to use costly insurance. Also, the impressive size of the multiplier suggests that private credit insurers provide information on foreign markets and …rms in ‡uencing the export decision of non-insured …rms. Finally, it demonstrates that credit insurance stimulates exports even without subsidisation, assuming private insurers charge a fair premium.
Zero (Insured) Trade
All the results above are generated from a linear-in-logs speci…cation that converts observations with zero exports to missing and these observations drop out of the sample, potentially introducing selection bias. Moreover, as I also take the log of insured exports, sample selection relating to the availability of private credit insurance could have biased the results as well. Indeed, the data set has 14 65672 observations of which 5082 correspond to zero exports and 49515 to zero insured exports. 24 I examine the sensitivity of the results when correcting for sample selection with respect to zero exports and insured exports. I follow Wooldridge (1995) by applying a sample selection model that is suitable for panel data with …xed e¤ects. 25 Table 5 .
Changes on the Extensive Margin
I have examined the e¤ect of private credit insurance on exports conditional on export ‡ows being positive. These results can be interpreted as an increase in exports on the intensive margin. In this section, I attempt to examine if private credit insurance also a¤ects the extensive margin of exports, that is, does the availability of private credit insurance increase the likelihood of trade between a pair of countries.
I follow the approach taken by Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) and estimate a linear probability model (LPM) where the dependent variable equals one if exports are positive. Contrary to a probit model, the LPM allows for estimation with dyadic …xed e¤ects. 26 To evaluate to e¤ect of private credit insurance on the extensive margin, I cannot use the value of insured exports by dyad (InsExp ijt ) as independent variable since positive insured exports imply positive exports. 27 Instead, I use the yearly sum of insured exports to all destination countries ( P j InsExp ijt ) for every exporter. Thus, I
examine whether an increase in an exporting country's sum of insured exports increases the likelihood of positive export ‡ows between the exporter and any destination country. Additionally, I allow the e¤ect of the sum of insured exports on the probability of positive exports ‡ows to vary with the level of importer country risk. Hereto, I group countries according to the …ve categories of composite risk as identi…ed by the International Country Risk Guide.
The results are reported in Table 11 . I only …nd evidence of a positive e¤ect of private credit insurance on the extensive margin for the very high risk group of destination countries. Thus, these results seem to suggest that private credit insurance stimulates exports primarily on the intensive margin. Nevertheless, while this might be true at the country-level, it is not unlikely that the impact of private credit insurance on the extensive margin is much more prominent at the …rm-level.
Public Credit Insurance
Next, I brie ‡y examine whether the positive and signi…cant e¤ect of private export credit insurance holds up when accounting for the public alternative. A priori, there is not much reason to expect the results to change, since private and public credit insurance are -due to the legal frameworkgenerally complements instead of substitutes.
I examine the public and private insurance e¤ect simultaneously by adding a variable for public insurance premium income to the benchmark model. 28 Since I only have data on public guarantees in the Netherlands, the sample reduces to Dutch exports in the period 1992-2002. Results are reported in Table 12 . I do not …nd public insurance to stimulate exports, at least not in the short run.
More importantly, the private insurance e¤ect remains positive and statistically signi…cant with a coe¢ cient of .17 (no …xed e¤ects) or .05 (dyadic …xed e¤ects), larger even than the benchmark results.
Methodological Issues
In this section, I test the sensitivity of the results to two di¤erent speci…cations of the gravity model. I estimate the benchmark model twice; …rst including the transformed trade costs variables using simple averages, and then using GDP weights. The results are presented in Table 13 , Columns 1 to 4. I run both models for the full sample and the subsample of observations with a share of insured exports above 10 percent. All estimations con…rm the positive e¤ect of insured exports on trade. The point estimates are statistically signi…cant, but with a range of .13 to .91 and .26 to .97 (respectively simple and GDP-weighted average), much larger than any of the previous estimates.
Tetradic Estimates
Another way to deal with the presence of multilateral resistance is the "method of tetrads", advocated The results are presented in Table 13 Either way, the actual decline in the supply of private credit insurance during the 2008-09 world trade collapse is unknown. Therefore, I calculate the contribution to the world trade collapse of various changes in the supply of private credit insurance, extrapolating the estimates of the insurance supply elasticity of exports. The results are presented in Table 14 . The …rst three rows estimate the export decline of a 10, 15 or 20 percent reduction in the supply of private credit insurance for various shares of privately insured to total exports. Recall from Section 5, that 6.1 percent of world exports in 2007 were covered by private short term export credit insurance. Using this share, the reduction in the supply of private insurance during the crisis can explain a decline of world exports of 1.4 to 2.9 percent, or 5 to 9 percent of the total drop in world exports (Table 14 , Column 1, Rows 4 to 6). In the Euro area, where an estimated 12.3 percent of exports is covered by private insurers, the reduction in the supply of private export credit insurance during the crisis can explain a decline of exports of 2.9 to 5.8 percent, or 10 to 20 percent of the total drop in exports from the Euro area countries (Table 14 , Column 4, Rows 7 to 9). Thus, while macroeconomic factors played an important role in the world trade collapse, these calculations suggest that the e¤ect of private credit insurance on exports identi…ed in this paper can account for part of the world trade decline.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the private credit insurance e¤ect on trade using a unique data set on the insurance provided and claims received by one of the world's largest credit insurers. The matched insurance-claims data enable me to identify the link between claims and the supply of export credit insurance, thus overcoming endogeneity issues. I …nd a short run average multiplier of private credit insurance of 2.3, implying that every euro of insured exports generates 2.3 euro of total exports. This multiplier is impressive, especially considering that previous studies …nd a long run multiplier of public guarantees of smaller size.
The paper is unique in its focus on the role of private export credit insurance and is the …rst to establish a causal link between the supply of a trade …nance product and exports. First, I provide a number of arguments explaining why private export credit insurance is important to trade. In particular, credit insurance stimulates exports to markets where …rms would not sell otherwise, allowing trade partners to build up reputation, thereby reducing the need for exporters to use costly insurance. Moreover, private insurers are likely to in ‡uence the export decision of non-insured …rms via the "signalling e¤ect" of their policy stance vis-à-vis individual …rms, their publicly available country ratings, and their detailed …rm-speci…c information services.
Subsequently, I estimate an insurance supply elasticity of exports in the range of .01 to .53. The elasticity increases with the share of insured to total exports. Accordingly, the estimates for the relevant subsamples reveal an elasticity of .14 for world exports and .29 for exports from Europe.
These results suggest that conditional on the actual decline in the supply of private credit insurance, All models include dyadic …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses.
Year e¤ects included but not recorded. Signi…cance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All models include dyadic and year …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. Signi…cance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. The inverse Mills ratio is calculated from the linear prediction of a probit model on P(X ijt >0), estimated for each year, following Wooldridge (1995) . All models include dyadic and year …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. Signi…cance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. The inverse Mills ratio is calculated from the linear prediction of a probit model on P(InsExp ijt >0), estimated for each year, following Wooldridge (1995) . All models include dyadic and year …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. Signi…cance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Regressors included but not recorded: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer Population; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Currency Union dummy; Common Language dummy;
Regional Trade Agreement dummy; Common Border dummy; # Islands; Log Product Area; Common Colonizer dummy; Currently Colony dummy; Ever Colony dummy; and Common country dummy. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. Year e¤ects included but not recorded.
29
Signi…cance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
